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Abstract 
Theorists have debated whether our ability to understand sarcasm is principally 
determined by the context (Gibbs, 1994; Utsumi, 2000) or by properties of the 
comment itself (Giora, 1997; 2003; Grice, 1975).1 The current research investigated 
an alternative view which broadens the focus on the comment itself, suggesting that 
mitigating a highly positive concept by using negation generates sarcastic 
interpretations by default (Giora et al., 2015a, 2018). In the current study, pre-tests 
performed on the target utterances presented in isolation established their default 
interpretations; novel affirmative phrases (e.g., He is the best lawyer) were interpreted 
literally, whereas equally novel negative counterparts (e.g., He isn’t the best lawyer) 
were interpreted sarcastically. In Experiment 1 (an eye-tracking study), prior context 
biased these utterances towards literal or sarcastic interpretations. Results showed that 
target utterances were easier to process in contexts supporting their default 
interpretations, regardless of affirmation/negation. Results from a second eye-tracking 
experiment suggested that readers’ tendency to interpret negative phrases sarcastically 
is related to their own tendency to use malicious humor. Our findings suggest that 
negation leads to certain ambiguous utterances receiving sarcastic interpretations by 
default and that this process may be further intensified by personality factors. 
  
                                                        
1 Sarcasm pertains here to verbal irony 
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Imagine that you had just given a lecture, and when reading the student 
evaluations of your class, you came across the comment, “Not the best teacher.” How 
would you feel? It is likely that you would initially adopt the sarcastic interpretation, 
according to which you are far from being the best teacher, and would thus be 
disappointed by such negative feedback. However, this comment is actually 
ambiguous between the sarcastic interpretation and a literal interpretation, in which 
you are, in fact, a good teacher, but some others may be better. The fact that readers 
or listeners seem to preferentially adopt the sarcastic interpretation of certain 
utterances causes problems for a number of contemporary accounts of sarcasm 
comprehension, and will be the focus of the current paper. 
From the description above, it can be seen that sarcasm is a form of verbal 
irony that is used with the intent to criticize. A number of theories have been put 
forward in the literature to explain how such ironic or sarcastic language is 
understood, including: The Standard Pragmatic Model (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979; 
1993), the Direct Access View (Gibbs, 1994; 2002), the Graded Salience Hypothesis 
(Giora, 1997; 2003), and the Defaultness Hypothesis (Giora, Givoni, & Fein, 2015a). 
Following the Standard Pragmatic Model, the function of (affirmative) verbal irony is 
to communicate the opposite of what is said. According to this account, the literal 
interpretation of an utterance is accessed first, and if a mismatch with context is 
detected, the utterance will be reanalyzed as being nonliteral (here sarcastic), and the 
literal interpretation will be suppressed. The extra stages involved in the processing of 
irony would then result in a processing cost for ironic compared to literal language. 
This, for example, could be observed in longer reading times for an ironic comment 
compared to the same comment uttered literally (e.g., Giora et al., 2007), or in longer 
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response times to sarcastically than literally related probe words (e.g., Fein, Yeari, & 
Giora, 2015).  
In contrast to this modular, stage-like account, the Direct Access View (Gibbs, 
1994; 2002) would predict that literal and ironic targets are processed in essentially 
the same way; given a sufficiently supportive context, the ironic meaning or 
interpretation of a phrase can be accessed or constructed directly, bypassing the literal 
interpretation. Thus, following this account we should expect no differences in 
reading times for literal and sarcastic materials (given equally supportive contexts 
across conditions). 
In contrast to the Standard Pragmatic Model, the Graded Salience Hypothesis 
(Giora, 1997; 2003) states that it is meaning salience (i.e., an entrenched, coded 
meaning affected by e.g., familiarity, frequency of usage, or prototypicality), rather 
than literalness, that is key. Hence, salient meanings are activated automatically on 
encountering the stimulus, regardless of other factors affecting processing (such as 
contextual support). For salient ironies (such as “That’s just great!”, which are 
regularly encountered ironically, and thus have an ironic entry in the mental lexicon), 
the salient ironic meaning can be accessed directly, and thus there should be no 
associated processing cost (e.g., Filik, Leuthold, Wallington, & Page, 2014; Giora, & 
Fein, 1999). 
For nonsalient noncoded ironies (i.e., novel phrases that the reader or listener 
is not used to encountering ironically), the predictions are the same as for the 
Standard Pragmatic Model, that is, the salience-based interpretation (based on the 
salient meanings of the utterance components) will be activated initially, and then 
reanalyzed as ironic, if contextual cues indicate that this is appropriate. In contrast to 
the Standard Pragmatic Model, the salience-based (often literal) interpretation of 
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sarcastic stimuli would be retained rather than suppressed, since the contrast between 
the ironic and salience-based literal interpretations underlies the function of irony 
(Giora, 1995), which is to draw attention to a failed expectation.  
Enlarging the scope of the Graded Salience Hypothesis, the Defaultness 
Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2015a) focuses on interpretations rather than meanings (but 
will treat salient meanings as default responses). Default interpretations need to be 
constructed, rather than accessed directly from the mental lexicon. Still, they are 
constructed automatically. Thus, a phrase such as “He isn’t the best teacher” will not 
have its sarcastic interpretation encoded in the mental lexicon. Nevertheless, the 
initial interpretation that is constructed unconditionally, regardless of strongly 
supportive context or explicit cues to the contrary, is the sarcastic one.  
To be considered a default interpretation, (i) stimuli must be novel 
(noncoded/unfamiliar), in order to distinguish them from salient meanings. In 
addition, (ii) they must be potentially ambiguous between a literal and nonliteral 
interpretation, so that a preference is allowed. They should, therefore, be free of any 
kind of internal cues such as semantic anomaly (Beardsley, 1958) or internal 
incongruity (Partington, 2011), which prompt nonliteralness, and (iii) free of any 
biasing external cues, such as contextual information or tone of voice, which might 
rule out either interpretation (for a comprehensive consideration of the conditions 
necessary for default interpretations, see Giora et al., 2015a).   
A number of recent studies have examined the hypothesis that certain negative 
constructions (in particular, phrases containing explicit negation modifying highly 
positive concepts, such as Punctuality is not his forte, Ambitious she is not, He is not 
the most organized student, or implicit negation modifying such concepts, as in Do 
you really believe she is honest?) can elicit sarcastic interpretations by default (e.g., 
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Giora et al., 2015a; Giora, Drucker, Fein, & Mendelson, 2015b; Giora, Givoni, 
Heruti, & Fein, 2017; Giora et al., 2013; 2018). For example, Giora et al. (2015a, 
Experiment 1.1) demonstrated that when presented out of context, negative phrases 
(in Hebrew) of the form “X is not the most Y” (e.g., He is not the most organized 
student), received a sarcastic interpretation (i.e., participants rated the utterance 
interpretation as closer to “He is quite messy” than “He is quite orderly, but less so 
than others”), suggesting that their default interpretation is sarcastic. In contrast, 
corresponding affirmative items (e.g., He is the most organized student) were 
interpreted literally (Experiment 1.2). In addition, when participants were asked to 
explicitly rate how sarcastic the items were (Experiment 1.3), negative items were 
rated as being significantly more sarcastic than affirmative counterparts.  
Giora et al. then conducted a self-paced reading study (Experiment 2) to 
examine how these negative and affirmative utterances were processed when 
presented in contexts biased towards either a literal or sarcastic interpretation of the 
target (strength of contextual bias was equally strong across all conditions, as 
determined by a pre-test). Results showed that reading times were shorter for default 
affirmative literal targets than for nondefault affirmative sarcastic counterparts and 
nondefault negative literal counterparts. Moreover, reading times were shorter for 
default negative sarcastic targets than for nondefault negative literal counterparts and 
nondefault affirmative sarcastic counterparts. The same pattern of effects was 
observed on a ‘spillover’ region (the two words following the critical target 
utterance). This was taken as evidence in support of the Defaultness Hypothesis in 
that default interpretations (i.e., sarcastic interpretations of negative items and literal 
interpretations of affirmative items) were easier to process than their nondefault 
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counterparts (i.e., literal versions of negative items and sarcastic versions of 
affirmative items). 
The aim of the current Experiment 1 is to further test the predictions of the 
Defaultness Hypothesis by replicating and extending the study of Giora et al. (2015a). 
Firstly, we aim to investigate whether the findings reported by Giora et al. generalize 
from Hebrew to English. Secondly, since eye-tracking has successfully been used in a 
number of recent studies to investigate factors that can influence the on-line 
processing of written irony (e.g., Au-Yeung, Kaakinen, Liversedge, & Benson, 2015; 
Filik et al., 2014; Filik & Moxey, 2010; Kaakinen, Olkoniemi, Kinnari, & Hyönä, 
2014; Olkoniemi, Ranta, & Kaakinen, 2016; Ţurcan & Filik, 2016; in press), we aim 
to use this methodology to examine the timecourse of processing in more detail. 
Specifically, in Experiment 1, we will monitor participants’ eye movements as they 
are reading negative and affirmative phrases (such as He isn’t the most popular 
hairdresser/He is the most popular hairdresser), which will be placed in contexts that 
bias either the sarcastic or literal interpretation of the target (see Table 1 for an 
example material in all four conditions).  
Most of the theories and experiments discussed thus far consider how aspects 
of the text influence the ease in which a comment is interpreted as literal or sarcastic. 
However, it is also important to consider how aspects of the perceiver may influence 
this process. Thus, in addition, we will explore whether aspects of the reader’s 
personality may influence the on-line processing and interpretation of the same 
negative utterances (Experiment 2). Specifically, we will investigate whether the 
participants’ own tendency to use malicious humor influences on-line processing of 
ambiguous utterances such as the negative constructions tested here. 
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In terms of predictions for Experiment 12, given that the items contain novel 
ironies, following the Graded Salience Hypothesis, we would expect to observe 
processing difficulty for nonsalient ironic targets compared to salience-based literal 
counterparts. Specifically, we would expect longer reading times on critical portions 
of the text in nonsalient sarcastic than salience-based literal conditions. Following the 
Direct Access View, we would expect no differences across conditions, given equally 
strong supportive contexts in both cases. Finally, following the Defaultness 
Hypothesis, we would predict shorter reading times for default readings compared to 
nondefault readings, regardless of degree of non/literalness. Specifically, for 
affirmative materials, we would predict shorter reading times for default literal 
materials than for nondefault sarcastic versions. We would also predict shorter 
reading times for default literal affirmative materials than nondefault negative literal 
materials. For negative materials, we would predict shorter reading times for default 
sarcastic than nondefault literal conditions. We would also predict shorter reading 
times for default negative sarcasm than nondefault affirmative sarcasm. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants: Forty native English-speakers from the University of 
Nottingham community (28 females) participated in the experiment. They received a 
small monetary award as an inconvenience allowance for participating.  
                                                        
2 We do not include predictions for the Standard Pragmatic Model for the following reason. According 
to this model, the ironic interpretation of an utterance is the opposite of the literal interpretation. 
Following this, for the negative materials used in the current study, such as “He’s not the most popular 
hairdresser”, the Standard Pragmatic Model would make erroneous predictions regarding the intended 
interpretation of these utterances when uttered sarcastically. Specifically, this model would predict that 
the sarcastic interpretation of “He’s not the most popular hairdresser” would be “He is the most popular 
hairdresser”, since this would be the opposite of not being the most popular hairdresser (see e.g., 
Coulson, 2005, and Tobin and Israel, 2012, for discussion). 
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 Materials and Design: Twenty-four experimental materials were constructed 
(see Table 1 for an example; the full set is available from the first author).  
 
Table 1. Example Material (Forward Slashes Denote Analysis Regions) 
 
Affirmative 
Literal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarcastic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative 
Literal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarcastic 
 
 
Jenny and Emily walked past the local beauty salon and noticed that it was 
full of customers. “I always see people inside the salon,” said Jenny. Emily 
replied: “Me too. The number of customers has definitely increased since 
the new owner took over and I believe his salon is busier than the others in 
town.” “I heard the owner plans on expanding the salon to meet demand,” 
said Jenny. Emily said: “Yes, I heard that too. It’s not surprising though, as/ 
he ispre-critical/ the mostfirst-critical/ popular hairdresser.”second-critical/ “You’re 
right.spillover/ It’s because everybody in this town appreciates his skills,” 
replied Jenny. 
 
Jenny and Emily walked past the local beauty salon and noticed that there 
were no customers. “I never see people inside the salon,” said Jenny. Emily 
replied: “I know. The number of customers has definitely plummeted since 
the new owner took over.” “The funny thing is,” said Emily, “he goes 
around town bragging about how he has to turn customers away as he is so 
busy.” “Indeed!” laughed Jenny. “Look at his empty salon. Clearly he ispre-
critical/ the mostfirst-critical/ popular hairdresser.”second-critical/ “You’re 
right,”spillover/ replied Emily. “He must be totally stupid as well.” 
 
 
Jenny and Emily walked past the local beauty salon and noticed that it was 
full of customers. “I always see people inside the salon,” said Jenny. Emily 
replied: “Me too. The number of customers has definitely increased since 
the new owner took over.” “Still, it isn’t as busy as the one in town. I heard 
the one in town is going to expand to meet demand,” said Jenny. Emily 
said: “Yes I know. So even though our local salon owner is quite busy, he 
isn’tpre-critical/ the mostfirst-critical/ popular hairdresser.”second-critical/ “You’re 
right.spillover/Give him time and things might be different,” replied Jenny.  
 
Jenny and Emily walked past the local beauty salon and noticed that there 
were no customers. “I never see people inside the salon,” said Jenny. Emily 
replied: “I know. The number of customers has definitely plummeted since 
the new owner took over.” “The funny thing is,” said Emily, “he goes 
around town bragging about how he has to turn customers away because he 
is so busy.” “Look at his empty salon,” laughed Jenny, “clearly, he isn’tpre-
critical/ the mostfirst-critical/ popular hairdresser.”second-critical/ “You’re 
right.”spillover/ replied Emily. “He must be totally stupid as well”.  
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A number of pre-tests were performed on the materials to ensure that they met the 
criteria for defaultness. As mentioned earlier, these criteria require that items be 
potentially ambiguous between literal and nonliteral interpretations. To avoid any 
bias, items should (i) share a similar degree of novelty, (ii) be free of semantic 
anomaly or internal incongruity, which invite nonliteralness, and (iii) be rated for 
degree of defaultness, when presented in isolation. 
Novelty pre-test: Twenty participants rated affirmative and negative items 
presented in isolation on a scale from 1 (unfamiliar) to 7 (familiar). Both sets of items 
were perceived as being unfamiliar and there was no significant difference in novelty 
ratings between affirmative (M = 1.79, SD = .59) and negative (M = 1.67, SD = .59) 
items, t < 1.  
Interpretation pre-test: Items presented in isolation were rated by 20 
participants on a 7-point scale, with one end of the scale indicating a literal 
interpretation (e.g., ‘He was a very popular hairdresser, but others were more 
popular’), and the other end indicating a sarcastic interpretation (e.g., ‘He was far 
from being the most popular hairdresser’). A score of 1 would indicate a literal 
interpretation, and a score of 7 would indicate a sarcastic interpretation. Results 
showed that affirmative items (M = 1.80, SD = .56) were interpreted significantly less 
sarcastically than negative items (M = 4.79, SD = .75), t(23) = 27.12, p <.001. In 
support of the suggestion that negative items received a sarcastic interpretation by 
default, and affirmative items received a literal interpretation by default, the results of 
one-samples t-tests indicate that negative items were consistently rated above the 
midpoint of the scale, t(23) = 5.14, p < .001, and affirmative items were consistently 
rated below the midpoint, t(23) = 19.33, p < .001. 
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Criticism pre-test: In order to assess whether items presented out of context 
were perceived as being critical and derisive (i.e., sarcastic), 24 participants rated 
each item on a 7-point scale ranging between 1(not at all critical or derisive) to 
7(extremely critical or derisive). Results showed that negative items (M = 5.30, SD = 
1.09) were rated as being significantly more critical and derisive than affirmative 
items (M = 2.89, SD = 1.68), t(23) = 4.9, p < .01. Having ensured that items presented 
out of context met conditions (i-iii) for defaultness, we wished to assess that the 
contexts that we created for the eye-tracking experiment were equally strongly biasing 
towards the intended interpretation across all conditions. 
Strength of contextual bias pre-test: Items were presented in context, and rated 
by 24 participants on a 7-point scale, with one end of the scale indicating a literal 
interpretation and the other end indicating a sarcastic interpretation (this was balanced 
across materials). For our purposes, a score of 1 would indicate weak contextual 
support, and a score of 7 would indicate strong contextual support for the intended 
interpretation. Results showed that for literal materials, there was no difference in 
contextual support between affirmative (M = 6.38, SD = .63) and negative (M = 6.17, 
SD = .69) materials, t < 1. For sarcastic items, affirmative materials (M = 6.55, SD = 
.61) were judged as receiving slightly more contextual support than negative materials 
(M = 6.20, SD = .66), t(23) = 2.71, p < .05. However, this would not explain any 
benefits in reading time predicted for negative compared to affirmative items, since 
the effect is in the opposite direction to our predictions. For affirmative items, there 
was no difference between literal (M = 6.38, SD = .63) and sarcastic (M = 6.55, SD = 
.61) conditions, t < 1. For negative items, there was no difference between literal (M = 
6.17, SD = .69) and sarcastic (M = 6.20, SD = .66) conditions, t < 1. 
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Eye-tracking procedure: Eye movements were recorded via an SR Research 
EyeLink 1000 eye-tracker, which sampled eye position every millisecond. Viewing 
was binocular, but only the right eye was recorded. Materials were displayed on a 17-
inch monitor, 56 cm from participants’ eyes. Before the experiment, the procedure 
was explained and participants were instructed to read normally. Participants were 
seated at the eye-tracker and their head was placed on a chin and forehead rest to 
minimize movements. Participants then completed a calibration procedure. Before the 
start of each trial, a fixation box appeared in the upper left quadrant of the screen. 
Once the participant fixated this box, the stimulus computer displayed the text. If the 
participant’s apparent point of fixation did not match with the fixation box then the 
experimenter re-calibrated the eye-tracker. Once a participant completed reading each 
item, they fixated a post-it note that was attached to the lower right-hand edge of the 
monitor, and pressed a key. A question (e.g., Were Jenny and Emily talking about the 
hairdresser?) was displayed following 25% of trials in order to ensure that 
participants were reading for comprehension. An average correct response rate of 89.4 
% indicated that this was the case. 
Data analysis. Materials were divided into analysis regions as shown in Table 
1. The pre-critical region comprised the beginning of the target phrase, and typically 
contained the words “(s)he is(n’t)”. The first-critical region was the first point in the 
sentence at which the participant might be able to detect whether the comment is 
intended literally, or sarcastically, and typically comprised words such as “the best/the 
most”. The phrase was fully disambiguated at the second-critical region, which 
contained the remainder of the utterance (e.g., “popular hairdresser”). The spillover 
region was the following two words. 
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An automatic procedure pooled short contiguous fixations. Fixations under 80 
ms were incorporated into larger adjacent fixations within one character and fixations 
under 40 ms that were not within three characters of another fixation were deleted, as 
were fixations over 1200 ms. Prior to analysis, trials where participants failed to read 
the sentence or there had been track loss, were eliminated. Specifically, we removed 
trials where two or more adjacent regions had zero first-pass reading times, 
accounting for 8.02 % of the data.  
Four measures of reading behavior are reported. Measures of early processing 
are first-pass reading time, which sums all fixations in a region until the point of 
fixation leaves the region either to the left or the right, and regression path (or go-
past) reading time, which is the sum of fixations from the time that a region is first 
entered until a saccade transgresses the right region boundary. Measures indicative of 
later processing are second-pass reading time, which sums the duration of fixations in 
a region after having left it either to the left or the right, and total reading time, which 
sums the duration of all fixations made within a region.  
When reading times were zero for a particular region, the relevant point was 
excluded from the analysis, and means were calculated from the remaining data points 
in the design cell. In the pre-critical region, this procedure accounted for 21.97% of 
first-pass and regression path data, and 10.42% of total time data; in the first-critical 
region, 18.91% of first-pass and regression path and 10.42% of total time data; in the 
second-critical region, 2.38% of first-pass and regression path and 2.15% of total time 
data, and in the spillover region, 9.40% of first-pass and regression path and 4.19% of 
total time data. 
 
Results and Discussion 
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Data for each region were subjected to two 2 polarity (affirmative vs. 
negative) x 2 context (literal vs. sarcastic) within-subjects ANOVAs, one treating 
participants (F1) and one treating items (F2) as random variables (see Table 2 for 
descriptive statistics, and Figures 1-3 for illustrations of the key findings). 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1. 
Region Measure 
(msec) 
Affirmative 
Literal 
M       SE 
Affirmative 
Sarcastic 
M       SE 
Negative 
Literal 
M       SE 
Negative 
Sarcastic 
M       SE 
        
Pre-critical First-pass 267 15.6 265 14.0 286 16.7 275 19.2 
 Regression 
path 
329 19.8 372 22.0 376 26.2 380 29.1 
 Second-pass 106 13.4 199 29.4 142 17.6 133 15.0 
 Total times 354 18.1 440 31.5 403 23.9 390 19.8 
          
1st Critical First-pass 236 10.5 225 10.1 239 9.6 230 10.1 
 Regression 
path 
311 16.2 342 27.9 307 18.6 308 16.6 
 Second-pass 108 13.4 175 21.9 136 21.1 98 11.5 
 Total times 340 17.5 390 22.4 362 22.9 313 13.4 
          
2nd Critical First-pass 466 20.7 471 30.0 515 35.0 476 22.2 
 Regression 
path 
646 27.0 775 48.4 785 59.9 710 32.8 
 Second-pass 141 18.9 192 30.2 162 28.3 141 22.8 
 Total times 611 28.3 665 41.3 682 47.0 620 25.0 
          
Spillover First-pass 319 19.3 325 18.0 309 17.5 318 17.9 
 Regression 
path 
370 19.8 390 36.7 404 28.4 407 64.1 
 Second-pass 62 9.8 89 18.7 56 8.8 59 10.5 
 Total times 372 20.4 398 24.6 356 20.0 352 18.6 
          
 
Pre-critical region “(s)he is(n’t)”: There were no significant effects in first-
pass or regression path reading times (Fs < 2.3, ps > .14). 
There was no main effect of polarity in either second-pass or total reading 
times, Fs < 1. Second-pass reading times showed a significant main effect of context, 
F1(1, 39) = 4.79, p < .05; F2(1, 23) = 4.55, p < .05, but total reading times did not, Fs 
< 2.9, ps > .09. Both measures of reading time showed an interaction, second-pass: 
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F1(1, 39) = 12.17, p < .01, F2(1, 23) = 4.29, p = .05; total reading times: F1(1, 39) = 
9.07, p < .01; F2(1, 23) = 3.53, p = .07. The fact that effects were only observed in 
later measures of reading time would suggest that these effects are due to participants 
re-reading the beginning of the sentence in conditions in which they experienced 
difficulty. 
Analysis of simple main effects showed that for literal sentences, affirmative 
targets had shorter reading times than negative targets in both second-pass, F1(1, 39) 
= 4.75, p < .05; F2(1, 23) = 1.84, p = .19, and total reading times, F1(1, 39) = 5.86, p 
< .05; F2(1, 23) = 2.17, p = .16 (significant by participants but not by items). This 
finding is consistent with the predictions of the Defaultness Hypothesis, in that default 
interpretations had shorter reading times than nondefault counterparts. Note, however, 
that this result could also be explained by theories of negation which would predict 
more difficulty for negative than affirmative materials (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1977; 
Horn, 1989).  
For sarcastic sentences, negative materials tended to have shorter reading 
times than affirmative materials in both second-pass, F1(1, 39) = 5.91, p < .05, F2(1, 
23) = 3.40, p = .08 (significant by participants only), and total reading times, F1(1, 
39) = 3.52, p = .07, F2(1, 23) = 1.46, p = .24 (approaching significance by 
participants but not significant by items). This finding is consistent with the 
predictions of the Defaultness Hypothesis (since default interpretations received 
shorter reading times than nondefault interpretations), but cannot be explained by 
Direct Access theories of sarcasm comprehension (which would not predict 
differences between negative and affirmative sarcastic materials presented in equally 
strong contexts). 
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Both measures showed that for affirmative sentences, there were significantly 
shorter reading times for literal materials than sarcastic counterparts, second-pass: 
F1(1, 39) = 11.14, p < .01; F2(1, 23) = 8.67, p < .01; total reading times: F1(1, 39) = 
7.66, p < .01; F2(1, 23) = 5.25, p < .05, a finding which is consistent with all theories 
under consideration (except for the Direct Access View). For negative sentences there 
were no differences (Fs < 1). 
 
Figure 1: Regression path reading times for pre-critical, critical 1, and critical 2 
regions (error bars show standard errors of the mean). 
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Figure 2: Second-pass reading times for pre-critical, critical 1, and critical 2 regions 
(error bars show standard errors of the mean). 
 
Figure 1: Total reading times for pre-critical, critical 1, and critical 2 regions (error 
bars show standard errors of the mean). 
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First critical region “the most”: There were no significant effects in first-pass 
or regression path reading times, Fs < 1 .9, ps > .17.  
There were no significant main effects in second-pass or total reading times Fs 
< 2.2, ps > .15. However, both measures revealed a significant interaction, second-
pass: F1(1, 39) = 13.38, p < .01; F2(1, 23) = 6.49, p < .05; total reading times: F1(1, 
39) = 8.08, p <.01; F2(1, 23) = 7.07, p < .05. Finding effects in late but not early 
measures would again suggest that effects are due to participants looking back and re-
reading earlier portions of the sentence in certain conditions. 
Simple main effects for both measures showed that for literal sentences, there 
were no differences between affirmative and negative conditions, Fs < 1.6, ps > .22. 
However, for sarcastic materials, there were shorter reading times for negative than 
affirmative sentences, second-pass: F1(1, 39) = 11.56, p < .01, F1(1, 23) = 7.02, p < 
.05; total reading times: F1(1, 39) = 11.80, p < . 01, F2(1, 23) = 8.67, p < .01. This 
finding would only be predicted by the Defaultness Hypothesis, according to which 
default interpretations (here, negative sarcasm) will supersede nondefault counterparts 
(here, affirmative sarcasm).  
 For affirmative sentences, there were shorter reading times for literal 
interpretations than sarcastic alternatives, second-pass: F1(1, 39) = 10.13, p < .01; 
F2(1, 23) = 3.95, p < .06; total reading times: F1(1, 39) = 3.85, p < .06; F2(1, 23) = 
2.48, p = .13, whereas for negative sentences there was a trend for shorter reading 
times for sarcastic materials than for literal counterparts, second-pass: F1(1, 39) = 
3.42, p = .07; F2(1, 23) = 2.02, p = .17; total reading times: F1(1, 39) = 4.45, p < . 05; 
F2(1, 23) = 3.84, p = .06. Again, this pattern of effects (although not robustly 
significant) is fully compatible with the predictions of the Defaultness Hypothesis, in 
that there were shorter reading times for default than nondefault interpretations. 
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Second critical region “popular hairdresser.”: There were no significant first-
pass effects, Fs < 3.2, ps > .08. Regression path reading times showed no main 
effects, Fs < 1.2, ps > .28, but there was a significant interaction, F1(1, 39) = 6.14, p 
< .05; F2(1, 23) = 4.75, p < .05. This finding would suggest that this was the first 
point in the critical sentence at which participants experienced processing difficulty 
(which they responded to by engaging in re-reading). Simple main effects showed that 
for literal materials, negative sentences had longer reading times than affirmative 
sentences, F1(1,39) = 5.37, p < .05; F2(1,23) = 3.05, p = .09, a finding which is most 
readily explained by the Defaultness Hypothesis. For sarcastic materials, there were 
no differences, Fs < 2.1, p > .16.  
For affirmative sentences, there were shorter reading times for literal than 
sarcastic conditions, F1(1,39) = 8.97, p < .01; F2(1,23) = 6.39, p < .05, which would 
be compatible with all theories except for the Direct Access View. For negative 
sentences there were no differences, Fs < 1.8, ps > .19. There were no significant 
second-pass, Fs < 2.2, ps > .15, or total time effects, Fs < 3.1, ps > .08. 
Spillover region “You’re right.”: There were no significant first-pass effects, 
Fs < 2.1, ps > .16. Regression path reading times showed no significant main effects, 
Fs < 1. The interaction was significant by items but not by participants, F1 < 1; F2(1, 
23) = 4.45, p < .05. Second-pass reading times showed no significant effects, Fs < 
2.6, ps > .11. Total reading times showed a marginal effect of polarity, F1(1, 39) = 
3.92, p < .06, F2(1, 23) = 4.57, p < .05. There were no other significant effects, Fs < 
1. 
Since the current study relates to incremental interpretation of phrases, rather 
than accessing the meanings of individual words, it is also informative to report 
findings that relate more to the end-point of this process, that is, total reading times 
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for the entire utterance (e.g., ‘he is/isn’t the most popular hairdresser’). Total reading 
times for the entire utterance also showed a significant interaction, F1(1, 39) = 13.41, 
p < .005; F2(1, 23) = 4.37, p < .05.  
For literal sentences, affirmative materials (M = 1225, SE = 51.8) were faster 
to process than negative materials (M = 1366, SE = 79.5), F1(1, 39) = 4.25, p < 
.05; F2(1, 23) = 2.14, p = .16, significant by participants but not by items. For 
sarcastic sentences, negative materials (M = 1253, SE = 49.8) were faster to process 
than affirmative materials (M = 1414, SE = 85.5), F1(1, 39) = 6.60, p <.05, F2(1, 23) 
= 4.46, p < .05.  
For affirmative sentences, there were shorter reading times for literal than 
sarcastic conditions, F1(1, 39) = 9.59, p < .005; F2(1, 23) = 3.20, p = .09, significant 
by participants but not by items. For negative sentences there was a trend towards 
shorter reading times for sarcastic than literal materials, F1(1,39) = 3.11, p = .09; 
F2(1, 23) = 1.78, p = .20. 
In sum, taken together, results were generally most compatible with the 
predictions of the Defaultness Hypothesis, in that reading times were shorter for 
materials receiving default interpretations than for those receiving nondefault 
interpretations. This would suggest that it is characteristics of the comment itself (here 
relating to non/defaultness) that play a key role in how it is both processed on-line and 
interpreted off-line (as evidenced by the results of the pre-tests). In the next 
experiment we also consider the possibility that characteristics of the perceiver may 
influence the on-line processing of similar materials.  
Experiment 2 
The use of sarcasm has been argued to serve a number of social functions, 
such as eliciting a particular emotional response in the recipient (e.g., Brown & 
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Levinson, 1987; Colston, 1997; Dews & Winner, 1995; Leech, 1983; see Filik, 
Brightman, Gathercole, & Leuthold, 2017, for recent discussion). Thus, it seems 
likely that individual difference factors may play a substantial role in how it is 
processed and understood (see e.g., Blasko & Kazmerski, 2006). Indeed, a number of 
recent eye-tracking studies have examined the role of individual variation in the on-
line processing of written sarcasm. For example, some studies suggest that an 
individual’s working memory capacity and emotional processing abilities (see, e.g., 
Olkoniemi et al., 2016) as well as whether they are autistic or not (Au-Yeung et al., 
2013) can influence eye movements during reading of sarcastic comments. 
Given this evidence, it seems relevant to consider which individual differences 
might influence an individual’s tendency to interpret certain phrases as sarcastic by 
default. A recent study examining individual differences in the use of verbal irony 
was conducted by Bruntsch and Ruch (2017). They found that an individual’s 
tendency to use irony was higher when they also scored highly on certain personality 
factors, such as their tendency to use ridicule aggressively. Thus, in the current 
experiment, we examine whether an individual’s tendency to use malicious humor 
themselves may influence their on-line processing of negative statements that are 
ambiguous between a literal and sarcastic interpretation.  
To measure participants’ level of malicious humor, we used the Indirect 
Aggression Scale Aggressor Version (IAS-A; Forrest, Eatough, & Shevlin, 2005), 
which is a reliable and valid 25-item scale measuring the level of three facets of 
indirect aggression (‘Malicious Humor’, ‘Social Exclusionary’, and ‘Guilt 
Induction’). Examples of the nine items that make up the malicious humor subscale 
are: ‘Made fun of people in public’, ‘Used sarcasm to insult them’, ‘Criticized them in 
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public’. Participants respond to these statements by indicating how often they have 
used each behavior against others, from 1 - ‘Never’ to 5 - ‘Regularly’.   
In Experiment 1, we used context to provide disambiguating information for 
the subsequently presented target utterance, and then analyzed participants’ reading 
behavior on the target utterance in relation to its fit with the prior context. In contrast, 
in Experiment 2, participants’ eye movements were monitored while they read short 
scenarios containing negative statements that were later disambiguated as being 
intended literally or sarcastically. For example, a comment such as “He isn’t the most 
popular hairdresser” could be followed by a statement such as “I see what you 
mean… A few of the other hairdressers are more popular” (indicating a literal 
interpretation in which the hairdresser is popular, but a small number of others are 
more popular) or “I see what you mean… Many of the other hairdressers are more 
popular” (indicating a sarcastic interpretation in which he is not popular, since a large 
number of others are more popular - see Table 3 for full examples in each condition). 
This approach allowed participants time to establish an interpretation of the 
ambiguous negative utterance, which would later be confirmed or disconfirmed by 
subsequently presented text, allowing us to directly tap into their interpretations of the 
target utterance. Following the eye-tracking study, participants completed the indirect 
aggression scale.  
If participants’ tendency to use malicious humor influences their on-line 
processing and comprehension of ambiguous phrases, then we would expect to 
observe a relationship between reading times and their scores on the malicious humor 
subscale. Specifically, in order to calculate ease of processing of the sarcastic 
interpretation of the negative phrases, we will subtract reading times for the sarcastic 
condition from the literal condition for each measure of reading time for the analysis 
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regions highlighted in Table 3, with the rationale that a larger number is indicative of 
a stronger preference for the sarcastic interpretation. Thus, if someone’s tendency to 
use malicious humor can influence their processing of ambiguous phrases, we might 
expect to observe a positive relationship between these (literal minus sarcastic) 
reading times, and scores on the malicious humor subscale of the indirect aggression 
questionnaire. 
 
Method 
Participants: Forty-eight native English-speakers from the University of 
Nottingham community (39 females, mean age 26.79, SD = 8.52) participated in the 
experiment. They received a small monetary award as an inconvenience allowance for 
participating.  
 Materials and Design: Twenty-eight experimental materials were constructed 
based on those used in Experiment 1 (see Table 3 for an example; the full set is 
available from the first author).  
 
Table 3. Example Material Experiment 2 (Forward Slashes Denote Analysis 
Regions). 
 
Literal 
 
 
 
 
Sarcastic 
 
 
 
Joan and Sarah looked into the window of the local hairdresser's salon./ 
“He isn't the most popular hairdresser,” commented Joan./ “I see what you 
mean,” replied Sarah, “A few of the/ other hairdresserspre-critical/ are more 
popular.”critical/ They debatedspillover/ where to go for lunch./ 
 
Joan and Sarah looked into the window of the local hairdresser's salon./ 
“He isn't the most popular hairdresser,” commented Joan./ “I see what you 
mean,” replied Sarah, “Many of the/ other hairdresserspre-critical/ are more 
popular.”critical/ They debatedspillover/ where to go for lunch./ 
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Procedure: The eye-tracking procedure was identical to Experiment 1. 
Following the eye-tracking task, the IAS-A questionnaire (Forrest et al., 2005) was 
administered via Qualtrics. 
Data analysis. Materials were divided into analysis regions as shown in Table 
3. The pre-critical region comprised the phrase “other X” (e.g., “other hairdressers”). 
The critical region was the point in the sentence at which the participant should be 
able to decide whether the previous comment was intended literally, or sarcastically, 
and typically comprised phrases such as “are more popular”. The spillover region was 
the following two words. 
The same data pooling procedures were used as in Experiment 1. Specifically, 
we removed trials where two or more adjacent regions had zero first-pass reading 
times, accounting for 9.30 % of the data. The same four measures of reading behavior 
are reported as in Experiment 1. When reading times were zero for a particular region, 
the relevant point was excluded from the analysis, and means were calculated from 
the remaining data points in the design cell. In the pre-critical region, this procedure 
accounted for 11.15% of first-pass and regression path data, and 3.44% of total time 
data; in the critical region, 0.57% of first-pass and regression path and 0.16% of total 
time data, and in the spillover region, 11.39% of first-pass and regression path and 0% 
of total time data. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Data for each region were subjected to two 2 interpretation (literal vs. sarcastic) 
paired-samples t-tests, one treating participants (t1) and one treating items (t2) as 
random variables (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics). 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for Experiment 2. 
Region Measure 
(msec) 
Literal 
M       SE 
Sarcastic 
M       SE 
        
Pre-critical First-pass 334 14.1 337 15.4 
 Regression 
path 
382 18.9 373 17.1 
 Second-pass 85 9.3 91 9.6 
 Total times 398 16.2 405 18.1 
      
Critical First-pass 486 23.0 504 24.0 
 Regression 
path 
659 24.0 681 28.5 
 Second-pass 144 16.5 127 14.2 
 Total times 629 26.0 630 25.7 
      
      
Spillover First-pass 282 13.3 279 14.2 
 Regression 
path 
329 19.2 343 24.5 
 Second-pass 124 14.2 120 12.8 
 Total times 388 20.4 375 19.6 
      
 
There were no significant effects in any measure of reading time in the pre-
critical (ts < 1.2, ps > .26), critical (ts < 1.5, ps > .16), or spillover region (ts < 1). 
Thus, it seems that when averaged across all participants, there was not a clear 
preference for either interpretation. We next examined whether participants’ 
likelihood of adopting a sarcastic interpretation is influenced by their own tendency to 
use malicious humor. 
 
Malicious Humor Scores 
Each participant’s Malicious Humor score was computed (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.75). Scores could range from 9 (never uses malicious humor against others) to 45 
(regularly uses malicious humor against others). Participants’ scores ranged from 10 
to 26 (M = 14.48, SD = 3.82). 
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Examining the Relationship Between Reading Time and Malicious Humor 
 
In order to examine the relationship between participants’ tendency to 
interpret a negative phrase sarcastically and their malicious humor score, we first 
needed to calculate a measure of their tendency towards a sarcastic interpretation. To 
do this, for each measure of reading time on each region of text, participants’ reading 
times for sarcastic materials were subtracted from their reading times for literal 
materials, with the rationale that larger resulting scores would indicate a greater 
tendency to interpret the phrases sarcastically. Next, in order to investigate whether 
these reading scores were related to malicious humor, bivariate correlations were 
performed between the malicious humor scores and participants’ literal minus 
sarcasm scores for each measure of reading time for the pre-critical, critical, and 
spillover regions (see Table 5).   
Results showed that both the regression path and total reading time literal 
minus sarcasm scores in the critical region were positively related to the level of use 
of malicious humor (see Figure 4, for illustration).  
 
Table 5. Bivariate Correlations (2-tailed) for Malicious Humor and Eye-tracking 
Scores (literal minus sarcastic) Experiment 2. 
Region Measure  Malicious Humor r   
   
.05 
.07 
.04 
.04 
 
.14 
  .32* 
.25 
  .32* 
 
 
        -.04 
         .10 
        -.17 
        -.17 
  
Pre-critical              First-pass   
              Regression path   
              Second-pass   
              Total times   
    
Critical              First-pass   
              Regression path   
              Second-pass   
              Total times   
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Spillover              First-pass   
              Regression path   
              Second-pass   
              Total times   
    
Note. * =  p = 0.03 
 
To investigate whether participants’ use of malicious humor may predict their 
reading behavior, we performed two simple regressions with participants’ malicious 
humor score as the predictor variable: one with the regression path literal minus 
sarcasm scores in the critical region as the criterion variable, and another with the 
total reading time literal minus sarcasm scores in the critical region as the criterion 
variable. Results showed that more regular use of malicious humor predicted larger 
regression path literal minus sarcasm scores (i.e., a greater tendency to interpret 
materials sarcastically) in the critical region and larger total reading time literal minus 
sarcasm scores in the critical region (see Tables 6 and 7 for regression results).   
 
Table 6. Simple Regression for Total Reading Times (L-S) Score in Critical Region 
for Experiment 2. 
 
Note. R2 = .08 
 
 
Table 7. Simple Regression for Regression Path (L-S) Score in Critical Region for 
Experiment 2. 
 
Note. R2 = .10 
 
Model          B       SE b         ß t Sig.  
       
Constant 
Malicious Humor 
-156.67 
   10.78 
70.80 
  4.73 
    
     .32 
-2.21 
  2.28 
.032 
.027 
 
Model          B       SE b         ß t Sig.  
       
Constant 
Malicious Humor 
-211.02 
   13.10 
85.17 
  5.69 
    
     .32 
-2.48 
  2.30 
.017 
.026 
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Figure 4: Scatter plot illustrating the relationship between literal minus sarcastic 
regression path reading times and malicious humor scores. 
General Discussion 
 In summary, results from Experiment 1 showed that readers experienced 
relative ease in processing: 1) default affirmative literal items compared to nondefault 
negative literal items and affirmative sarcastic items. They also experienced relative 
ease of processing for (2) default negative sarcastic items compared to nondefault 
negative literal items and affirmative sarcastic items. A number of these results can be 
explained by traditional accounts of irony processing. Specifically, the finding that 
affirmative sarcasm is more difficult to process than affirmative literal materials can 
be readily explained by the Graded Salience Hypothesis, which would predict longer 
reading times for sarcastic than literal materials, due to the extra steps involved in 
understanding novel ironies. In addition, the finding that negative literal materials are 
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more difficult to process than affirmative literal materials can be accounted for by 
theories of negation. However, the full pattern of effects is best accommodated by the 
Defaultness Hypothesis, since it was the case that readers experienced more 
processing difficulty with nondefault (i.e., affirmative sarcastic and negative literal) 
than default (i.e., affirmative literal and negative sarcastic) interpretations. 
In relation to the empirical literature, the current findings both support and 
extend those of Giora et al. (2015a), who also found this pattern of results in a self-
paced reading study, using Hebrew materials. The results of the current experiment 
demonstrate that these findings generalize to English materials. In addition, with the 
use of eye-tracking during reading, we were able to examine in more detail the 
timecourse of processing. From the current eye-tracking results we were able to 
determine that the first point at which readers appear to experience processing 
difficulty is in regression path reading times for the part of the sentence where the 
intended interpretation is ultimately disambiguated as being literal or sarcastic (i.e., 
the second critical region which contained words such as “popular hairdresser”). 
Interestingly, there were no differences in early reading time measures on the first 
critical region (e.g., the region containing words such as “the best/the most”), which is 
the first point at which readers may have been able to construct the intended 
interpretation. This may reflect the more incremental nature of the interpretative 
processes involved in the current study, as opposed to some previous studies that have 
found effects in early reading measures, when investigating issues relating to lexical 
interpretation of salient versus nonsalient ironic expressions (e.g., Filik et al., 2014). 
Finally, it appears that readers go back and re-read the beginning of the sentence as 
evidenced by longer second-pass and total reading times on early portions of the 
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target sentence, which provides evidence that some degree of reanalysis may be 
required in the case of nondefault interpretations.  
 Results from Experiment 2 suggested that a reader’s tendency to interpret 
certain phrases sarcastically can be influenced by factors of their personality, 
specifically, their tendency to use malicious humor against others. That is, the more 
regularly participants reported using malicious humor towards others (as indicated by 
their scores on the indirect aggression scale), the higher their reading times scores for 
literal minus sarcastic conditions, indicating a greater tendency to interpret the 
scenarios sarcastically. This provides some evidence that individual difference factors 
can influence on-line processes in text comprehension. This finding would add to 
recent evidence from other eye-tracking studies showing that factors such as working 
memory capacity, emotional processing ability (e.g., Olkoniemi et al., 2016), as well 
as the presence of autistic traits (e.g., Au-Yeung et al., 2013) can influence the on-line 
processing of sarcasm. It is important to note that some aspects of the results from 
Experiment 2 (i.e., no overall difference in reading times between literal and sarcastic 
conditions) could be taken as support for the Direct Access View (which would 
predict such a null result). However, the Direct Access View cannot explain the 
results from Experiment 1, nor the influence of personality factors in Experiment 2. 
In conclusion, we conducted two eye-tracking experiments in which we 
investigated the on-line processing of written sarcasm. Results from Experiment 1 
were most compatible with predictions of the Defaultness Hypothesis (Giora et al., 
2015a), in that reading times suggested that participants experienced relative 
processing ease with default than nondefault interpretations of ambiguous phrases. 
Results from Experiment 2 suggest that aspects of a reader’s personality, in particular, 
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their tendency to use malicious humor against others, can influence their on-line 
processing and interpretation of ambiguous phrases.  
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